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The relationship between education and social welfare attitudes is understudied and 
potentially complex. Some of the mixed findings to date could be explained by “the 
underdog principle,” which is the notion that the most vulnerable individuals in society—
e.g., women, ethnic minorities, low-income individuals—are more likely to favor social 
welfare, given its potential benefits to them (Robinson & Bell, 1978).  Employing data 
from the International Social Survey Programme 2009, we used hierarchical linear 
models to explore whether and to what extent education makes a difference in social 
welfare attitudes among underdogs and topdogs. The results suggest that after controlling 
for age and socioeconomic status, educational attainment among topdogs tends to be 
associated—if at all—with a less favorable attitude towards social welfare. For underdogs 
the association was smaller or non-existent. This reinforces the importance of attending 
to socioeconomic diversity when examining the effects of education, and supports a 
concern expressed by a number of scholars (e.g., Biesta, 2009; Labaree, 2014; Nussbaum, 
2010; Siegel, 2004) that important non-economic aims of education may be insufficiently 
articulated and advanced in societies today.  
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In our increasingly interconnected world, at a time when income inequality within and between 
nations is considered one of the most serious problems in society (Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, 
Suphaphiphat, Ricka, & Tsounta, 2015), it is important to gather evidence on how education, in 
its current form, affects attitudes toward income inequality and related notions of social welfare. 
On one hand, education appears to enlighten (Davis & Robinson, 1991) or transform (Dirkx, 
Mezirow, & Cranton, 2006) people to care more about those who are less well-off, and adopt 
more egalitarian attitudes. On the other hand, it is conceivable that current educational systems 
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make people more individualistic, critical, nuanced, careful, conservative, and/or self-centered, 
which in turn might enable less favorable attitudes toward egalitarianism and social welfare.  
The relationship between education and social welfare attitudes—including attitudes 
towards income inequality, redistribution and welfare programs—is understudied and potentially 
complex. Scholarship on the educational effects of “liberalist attitudes” has focused on certain 
subsets of social values (e.g., civil liberties and tolerance of minorities), and pay very little 
attention to economics attitudes. Existing studies on predictors of social welfare attitudes tend to 
include education as a control variable, but not as one of the focal variables of interest, and 
results from these studies are somewhat mixed. Some show that greater levels of education are 
associated with less support for social welfare (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; 
Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Jæger, 2006; Linos & West, 2003). These scholars theorize that higher 
education is associated with higher income, making individuals less likely to be the direct 
beneficiaries of social welfare programs, and thus less likely to support them. On the other hand, 
there is evidence suggesting that education has a positive association with social welfare attitudes 
(Gelissen, 2000). This argument hinges on the belief that a more educated person is likely to be 
well socialized on democratic values, and thus more liberally minded (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 
1989).   
An important factor to consider when examining these mixed findings is “the underdog 
principle,” which is the notion that the most vulnerable individuals in society—e.g., women, 
ethnic minorities, low-income individuals—are more likely to favor social welfare, given its 
potential benefits to them (Robinson & Bell, 1978). Many studies on attitude toward social 
welfare have supported the idea that such a principle may hold (Junisbai, 2010; Kelley & Evans, 
1993; Linos & West, 2003; Miller, 1992). This may help explain why the association between 
education and social welfare attitudes is not straight forward: The effect of education may 
condition on whether individuals are underdogs or not, and may affect different kinds of 
underdogs in different ways.  
One of this study’s main research questions was whether and to what extent education 
makes a difference in social welfare attitudes among topdogs, which we define as working age, 
non-disabled males who consider themselves to be upper-middle class. We also examined the 
same question among societal underdogs, which we defined as either working age individuals 
who considered themselves to be of low socioeconomic status, were disabled, or were elderly.  
To our knowledge, there has only been one other multi-level analysis of cross-national 
data focusing on the relationship between education and socioeconomic values (Weakliem, 
2002), which did not consider the moderating effect of underdogs. Understanding the 
relationship between education and attitude towards social welfare is important because those 
who make decisions about social welfare, and/or sway public opinion about it, are typically more 
educated. If this key demographic is unconcerned about income inequality and related issues, we 
could start a conversation about whether this is what is best for society, and whether anything in 
our current education systems needs changing. Similarly, if underdogs and topdogs differ in their 
relationship between education and their attitude towards socioeconomic inequality, it should 
motivate us to think more about whether and how the affordances of education might differ 
across these two groups, and their associated implications.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
A variety of factors have been thought to impact individuals’ attitudes and opinions about social 
welfare. In this section we review these factors in terms of each individual’s situational, 
ideological and demographic factors as well as his or her national factors. We also highlight 
previous work on the relationship between education and social welfare attitudes to advance this 
study forward.  
 
 
Situational, Ideological and Demographic Factors Related to Social Welfare 
Attitudes 
 
Life circumstances or situations have been presumed to affect one’s attitude toward social 
welfare. Such factors include, but are not limited to: poverty, unemployment, health levels of self 
and family, whether individuals are welfare beneficiaries, and whether people live in 
economically under-resourced areas. Perhaps not surprisingly, those who have benefitted from 
state resources have often been hypothesized to hold favorable views toward social welfare and 
related issues, based on some form of utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1879).  
For example, Sevä, Sociologiska, Umeå, and Samhällsvetenskapliga (2009) found that 
those living in Swedish municipalities suffering from high unemployment rates, ill health and 
depopulation, tended to be more supportive of welfare. In a longitudinal study of Canadian 
attitudes, Jæger (2006) found that those with higher incomes tend to be less supportive of the 
idea that the government should provide a decent standard of living to its citizens, presumably 
because they have less to benefit from it. Similar negative relationships between income or 
socioeconomic status, and favorable attitude towards social welfare or egalitarianism have been 
documented by Andreß and Heien (2001), Arts and Gelissen (2001) and Linos and West (2003). 
However, human attitudes are complex, and there are variations among, and exceptions to, most 
discovered relationships. For example, Jæger (2006) found that among Canadians, 
unemployment was not significantly related to attitude towards welfare. In an interesting 
comparative analysis between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, Junisbai (2010) found that higher 
household income appeared to dampen the attitude towards egalitarianism of citizens in the 
former country, but not the latter, and explained this difference in terms of the differences in the 
countries’ socioeconomic conditions.  
An individual’s personal beliefs and ideologies, including their political views, religious 
values, and beliefs about social mobility, should also be strongly related to social welfare 
attitudes. Generally, studies have found evidence to support the supposition that those who are 
more socially liberal, and more in favor of the principle of equality, are more in favor of 
government policies that favor social welfare. For example, in a multilevel analysis of 24 
industrialized nations, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) found that those who held more 
egalitarian attitudes tended to also hold more favorable views towards the position that the 
government should provide support to those who are sick, old, and unemployed. In a multilevel 
analysis of 14 European nations, Gelissen (2000) reported that those who associate themselves 
with a more politically liberal position tend to be more supportive of government welfare. Other 
ideological predictors positively associated with social welfare attitudes include religious 
traditionalism (Davis & Robinson, 1999, 2006), and the belief that social mobility is difficult 
and/or that society is unfair (Fong, 2001; Funk, 2000; Linos & West, 2003; Luo, 1998).   
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Situational and ideological factors at regional and national levels, including sociopolitical 
structure, neighborhood socioeconomic status, and political beliefs of citizens, have also been 
identified as potential contributors to individual attitudes about social welfare. Blekesaune and 
Quadagno (2003), for example, found that average unemployment and egalitarian ideology 
among industrialized nations were positively associated with agreement for society to support the 
unemployed, while just the former was positively associated with the view that society should 
support the sick and old. Gelissen (2000) found that among European nations, regime type was 
associated with preference for welfare states.  
Finally, demographic factors, particularly sex and age, have often predicted whether 
individuals favor social welfare. Women consistently have a more favorable view towards social 
welfare than men, among 24 industrialized nations (Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003), Canadian 
citizens (Jæger, 2006), citizens of Norway, US and Germany (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Linos & 
West, 2003), or 20 International Social Survey Programme participant nations (Arts & Gelissen 
2001). This could be because females espouse what Svallfors (1997, p. 290) has characterized as 
“rationality of caring,” and have a tendency to care more about others. Age has often been 
included in these and related studies, but has been inconsistent in its ability to predict support for 
social welfare. For example, Jæger (2006) found that age had a slight negative relationship with 
whether government should provide a decent standard of living for everyone, though no 
association with the idea that there should be redistribution. Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) 
found that age did not significantly predict attitude towards social welfare after controlling for 
gender, and egalitarian ideology at the individual and national level. 
 
  
Mixed Findings on the Relationship between Education and Social Welfare 
Attitudes 
 
To the best of our understanding, the only cross-national study that has examined education as 
the focal variable of interest is that by Weakliem (2002), which used hierarchical linear modeling 
to explore “the effects of education on political opinions.”  Using the World Values Survey that 
included data from 1989 to 1993 in 40 nations, Weakliem examined the relationship between an 
individual’s age at the completion of full-time schooling, with their responses to over 20 political 
questions. He found that after controlling for age, gender and socioeconomic class, there was a 
“clear tendency” for education to be negatively associated with liberal, or more egalitarian, ideas 
about economic social welfare. For example, a one-year increase in the formal education was 
associated with a 1.07 percent shift in the population from complete agreement to complete 
disagreement with the statement that “incomes should be made more equal,” and a 0.57 percent 
shift towards disagreement with the statement that “the state should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for.”  A seeming exception was that those who were educated 
were more likely to disagree with the statement “it is unfair to give work to handicapped people 
when able-bodied people can’t find jobs.”  Communist rule and the gross domestic product did 
not make a difference on these particular predictions. However, for environmental and social 
political views (e.g., on protecting the environment, and status of women in the workplace), 
more education was associated with more liberal views. Weakliem explained this pattern by 
arguing that those who were educated were more likely to support individual freedoms and 
oppose institutional restrictions of such freedoms.  
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In a study examining the relationship between welfare regime and beliefs about welfare 
distribution, Arts and Gelissen (2001) hypothesized that all else being equal, those who were 
more educated would be more likely to support universal rights to social welfare benefits, and/or 
believe that those who are in need of such benefits should receive them. However, their 
hypothesis was rejected. Consistent with Weakliem’s study, their results revealed that the more 
educated were more likely to favor an equity-based view (i.e., that those who contribute more to 
society deserve to receive more benefits), rather than equality or need-based views. Arts and 
Gelissen surmised that this could be because education may have been accounting for the effects 
of income.  
Negative relationships between education and an egalitarian attitude of social welfare 
have also been documented across a number of Western nations by Andreß and Heien (2001), 
Bean and Papadakis (1998), Linos and West (2003) and Jæger (2006). However, since education 
was not the focal variable in these studies, the reason for the negative relationship has not been 
sufficiently explored. In addition, empirical findings on the relationship between education and 
social welfare attitudes have proved inconsistent. While Bean and Papadakis (1998) found 
negative relationships between education and egalitarian attitude in Austria and the U.S., they 
found no such effects in four other Western European countries. Junisbai (2010) similarly 
showed a negative relationship between education and egalitarian attitude in Kyrgyzstan, but not 
in Kazakhstan, while Robinson and Bell (1978) found a positive relationship between education 
and egalitarian attitude in the U.K. although not the U.S. In a study of 14 European countries in 
1992, Gelissen (2000) was able to show that years of education positively predicted a more 
egalitarian attitude towards social welfare, although this effect was dampened among the 
political-right. He inferred that education might socialize or “enlighten” people to accept and 
more strongly believe in equality, as Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) and Robinson and Bell 
(1978) had also suggested.  
 
  
Possible Explanations for Mixed Findings: Conflicting Educational Aims & 
Underdog Principle 
 
These mixed findings may not be surprising considering that education is used to achieve 
multiple, and often conflicting aims of individuals and societies. Labaree (1997) has argued, for 
example, that education in the U.S. has historically been used by the state to foster democratic 
citizenship and economic development, and used by citizens to improve or preserve their 
socioeconomic status. Similarly, and from a cross-national perspective, Biesta (2009) has 
suggested that education qualifies citizens in professional and life skills (qualification function), 
helps them become part of “social, cultural and political ‘orders’” (socialization function), and at 
the same time helps them individuate from such orders (subjectification function). While 
education’s citizenship development and socialization aims may positively impact social welfare 
attitudes, its economic development and social mobility aims may counter such effects. These 
scholars and others (e.g., Nussbaum, 2010; Siegel, 2004) have also raised concern that globally 
and in the U.S., economic aims of education have been heavily prioritized at the expense of other 
important aims. If so, we would expect education to be associated with negative attitudes 
towards social welfare, since more education would not only qualify people for higher wages, 
but also provide more opportunities to perceive and analyze problems in terms of economics 
(i.e., in terms of costs, benefits, risks, investments, etc.). 
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An important confounding factor to consider when examining these mixed findings on 
the impact of education on social welfare attitudes, is the “underdog principle,” or the idea that 
the more vulnerable individuals in society are more likely to favor social welfare and egalitarian 
principles, given their potential to benefit from them (Robinson & Bell, 1978). If one’s education 
impacts social welfare attitudes, and if underdog status has divergent effects on these attitudes 
(e.g., Junisbai, 2010; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Linos & West, 2003; Miller, 1992), it seems 
possible that underdogs and topdogs differ in the relationship between educational attainment 
and their attitudes towards social welfare. Therefore, this study explores whether education is 
related to social welfare attitudes, and whether this relationship is conditional on one’s underdog 
status.  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION & METHODS 
 
We asked, after controlling for a variety of demographic factors, 1) how is education related to 
social welfare attitudes for socioeconomic topdogs, 2) how is education related to social welfare 
attitudes for socioeconomic underdogs, and 3) does the relationship between education and 
social welfare attitudes differ between underdogs and topdogs?  Based on aforementioned 
concern about the over-prioritization of economic aims in education, we hypothesized that more 
education may be associated with less support for social welfare. We hypothesized that the 
pattern would be weaker or reversed for underdogs because they, or people they know and care 
about, would be more likely to be social welfare beneficiaries, and therefore they would be more 
amenable to valuing social welfare.  
We used data from the International Social Survey Programme 2009: Social Inequality 
IV (ISSP 2009), which includes attitudinal data about social inequality in 40 countries. The 
sampling procedure differed for each country, but consisted generally of simple and multi-stage 
stratified random sampling. Methods used for data collection included, but was not limited to, 
paper and pencil, face-to-face, and online surveying.  
Data in ISSP 2009 (N=54,733) was collected between February 2008 and January 2012. 
The sample in our first analysis was limited to the 7,365 respondents who identified as 
“topdogs,” meaning they were men aged 25-65, who placed themselves on the top half of a 10-
point societal scale, and who are not permanently disabled. Those who reported themselves to be 
unemployed were included in the sample because it seemed likely, given their high self-
perceived SES, that such respondents were not in the labor force by choice rather than necessity. 
However, those who reported that their current employment status was “housewife, houseman, 
home duties” were excluded, since this seemed to connote a less powerful and less mainstream 
societal position than those who are employed or unemployed by choice.  
The “underdog” sample was limited to 17,792 respondents who were of approximate 
working age (age 25 to 65) and either considered themselves to be of low socioeconomic status 
(i.e., rated themselves as lowest to third-lowest rung on a 10-point scale), or were permanently 
disabled, or were age 66 or above (and likely receiving state assistance for income).  
Ideally, for both samples, we would have screened for ethnic and religious minority status, 
and for sexual orientation, such that these other minority groups would have been represented. 
However, there were no variables that clearly and consistently identified these characteristics 
across countries. Those who fit the inclusion/exclusion criteria, but had missing data on any of 
62     IWATANI & YE 
 
 
the predictors (<1% of topdogs and <5% of underdogs) and dependent variables (<5% for most 
questions, see Tables 4 and 5), were also excluded.  
The data were analyzed through a 2-level hierarchical linear model, using individuals at 
level 1 and country at level 2. HLM 7 software (Raudenbush, Byrk, Cheong, Congdon, & du 
Toit, 2011) was used to perform the analysis, while SPSS 22 was used for descriptive statistics 
and checking assumptions. The dependent variable in this model comprised of responses to 8 
five-point Likert-scale items that tapped individuals’ attitudes about social inequality. For 
example, respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with statements such as, “It 
is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with 
high incomes and those with low incomes” (Table 3 lists all items). Since the correlations 
between most responses were not high enough to warrant combining the items into one scale, 
each of the items were considered as separate, continuous dependent variables. These variables 
were recoded, when necessary, so that higher scores indicated a more positive attitude towards 
egalitarianism and social welfare.  
Given that we wanted to compare results across models, we used the same model 
structure to predict each of the dependent variables. For both topdog and underdog analyses, 
independent variables at the individual level were age, educational attainment (DEGREE), and 
SES. Level of education was considered as a continuous variable on a 6-point scale (1=no formal 
qualification, 2=lowest formal qualification, 3=above lowest formal qualification, 4=higher 
secondary completed, 5=above higher secondary level, and 6=university degree completed). SES 
was based on self-perceived social standing, reported on a scale of 1 through 10. All three level-1 
variables were grand-mean centered so the intercept could be interpreted as adjusted country 
mean. Since the underdog sample included both men and women, sex (a dummy predictor, 
where female = 1) was additionally included at the individual level without centering.  
The country-level predictors included the mean educational attainment 
(MEAN_DEGREE) and the proportion of topdogs or underdogs (PROP_TOPD, or PROP_UD). 
The former was included to account for any contextual effects of education on the outcome, such 
that the coefficient for education at the individual level would only include the within-country 
effect. The latter was included to capture any differential effects associated with the prevalence 
of topdogs that exist in each country. Each were included only as predictors of the level-1 
intercept. Both predictors were grand-mean centered. For both samples, the level-1 intercept, and 
educational attainment slopes were modeled as random, as were the underdog SES slopes. This 
was because the preliminary analyses indicated these and not the other level-1 coefficients, 
varied significantly between countries for each of the outcomes.  
Thus, the following HLM models were constructed for each dependent variable: 
 
Level-1 Model for Topdog 
 
ATTITUDEij = β0j + β1j*(AGEij - 𝐴𝐺𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ..) + β2j*(DEGREEij - 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ..) + β3j*(SESij - 𝑆𝐸𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅..) + rij  
where rij ~ N(0, σ
2
) 
 
Note. The model for underdogs was the same, except that it also included sex as a predictor. 
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Level-2 Model for Topdog 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(PROP_TOPDj - 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃_𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ .) + γ02*(MEAN_DEGREEj - 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁_𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ .) 
+ u0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20 + u2j 
β3j = γ30  
where [
𝑢0𝑗
𝑢2𝑗
] ~ N ([
0
0
] , [
𝜏00 𝜏02
𝜏20 𝜏22
]) 
 
Note. The model for underdogs was the same except that it additionally modeled the slope of sex, 
and it modeled the slope of SES as random. 
 
 
Assumptions were checked for all models, and the null-model ICC and proportion of 
variance explained were calculated for all models.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Approximately 78% of the 7,365 topdogs were employed full time, less than 7% were employed 
part time or less than part time, 9% were retired, 4% were unemployed, and less than 2% had 
other responses. In contrast, just 23% of the 17,792 underdogs were employed full time, while 
43% were retired, 8% performed home duties, 8% were unemployed, 7% were part-time or less 
than part-time employed, 6% were permanently disabled, and 3% were either students or 
otherwise not in the workforce. On a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) of social status, 
approximately 49% of topdogs reported a score of 6, 31% a 7, 14% an 8, 3% a 9, and less than 
2% a 10. In contrast, 62% of the underdogs rated themselves a 3 or below, 82% a 5 or below, and 
only 3% above a 7. Approximately 31% of the topdogs and 9% of underdogs completed a 
university degree. 18% of topdogs’ and 11% of underdogs’ highest education level was a degree 
above higher secondary level. 23% of topdogs and 22% of underdogs completed just up to higher 
secondary, while 19% and 22%, respectively, completed above lowest qualification, 8% and 
27% completed the lowest formal qualification, and less than 2% and 10%, respectively, had no 
formal educational qualification. 55% of underdogs were female. The mean (and standard 
deviation of) SES, education and age across countries were 6.74 (.90), 3.45 (1.27) and 44.6 
(11.22), respectively for topdogs, and 3.82 (1.73), 2.27 (1.31) and 58.9 (16.8), respectively for 
underdogs. To provide a further contrast, the mean (and standard deviation of) SES, education 
and age of all ISSP 2009 respondents were 5.07 (1.67), 2.85 (1.35) and 46.8 (16.8), respectively. 
On average, 14% of each country’s sample met the topdog criteria. The 15 countries with the 
most topdogs (17-27%) were all highly-industrialized Western nations, while the 14 countries 
with the smallest proportion of topdogs (3-10%) consisted of 9 Eastern European countries, 2 
Asian countries, Chile and Portugal. The descriptive statistics of topdogs, underdogs, and the 
overall sample by country, are provided in Tables 1 through 3.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Topdogs by Country (N = 7365) 
 
SES  Education Age  
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD N 
Argentina 6.66 .83 3.06 1.43 43.4 12.06 136 
Australia 6.89 .91 4.20 1.03 49.8 10.41 250 
Austria 6.75 .86 2.68 1.24 45.4 10.96 240 
Belgium 6.81 .82 3.43 1.04 46.1 11.38 238 
Bulgaria 6.69 1.02 3.81 .99 46.6 11.43 140 
Chile 6.62 .86 4.06 1.32 43.0 11.19 69 
China 6.41 .78 2.59 1.27 43.6 11.67 454 
Croatia 6.64 .87 3.34 1.20 41.5 10.97 94 
Cyprus 6.91 1.07 3.82 1.31 42.8 10.85 179 
Czech Republic 6.59 .88 3.07 1.19 43.8 12.09 150 
Denmark 6.84 .91 3.70 .90 47.4 10.60 346 
Estonia 6.73 .97 3.41 1.03 42.4 13.11 80 
Finland 7.18 .97 3.58 1.30 47.9 11.42 180 
France 6.67 .84 3.55 1.49 51.6 10.45 374 
Germany 6.74 .83 2.72 1.48 45.7 11.03 296 
Great Britain 6.72 .93 3.30 1.70 47.0 11.11 151 
Hungary 6.40 .66 3.34 1.14 43.6 10.91 65 
Iceland 6.85 .84 3.33 1.57 44.5 11.12 195 
Israel 7.12 1.15 3.29 1.36 43.9 12.20 198 
Italy 6.47 .69 3.55 1.19 47.8 10.79 115 
Japan 6.57 .72 4.12 1.17 49.0 10.01 99 
Latvia 6.84 .95 3.72 1.18 42.2 11.68 74 
New Zealand 6.96 .92 3.61 1.53 48.1 11.83 198 
Norway 6.89 .90 3.74 1.26 47.1 11.06 394 
Philippines 6.80 1.14 3.08 1.30 41.6 10.50 76 
Poland 6.72 .98 3.34 1.33 43.2 12.45 179 
Portugal 6.80 1.06 2.88 1.56 44.6 11.69 89 
Russia 6.41 .77 3.86 1.15 41.5 11.26 153 
Slovak Republic 6.65 .77 3.51 1.24 43.7 12.07 113 
Slovenia 6.76 .91 3.43 1.28 43.1 11.26 105 
South Africa 7.05 1.07 3.10 1.53 42.9 10.76 385 
Spain 6.57 .85 3.33 1.38 43.1 11.22 136 
South Korea 6.49 .74 4.35 .93 42.3 9.96 170 
Sweden 6.87 .91 3.33 1.43 46.2 10.35 246 
Switzerland 6.95 .88 3.31 1.31 44.5 11.34 219 
Taiwan 6.38 .73 3.88 1.20 43.6 10.83 162 
Turkey 6.79 1.02 2.71 1.59 42.6 11.43 101 
Ukraine 6.47 .83 4.24 .95 40.2 10.82 51 
US 6.66 .94 3.82 1.09 45.5 11.25 325 
Venezuela 7.11 1.14 2.77 1.22 40.6 11.23 140 
Unweighted Avg 6.74 .90 3.45 1.27 44.6 11.22 184 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Underdogs by Country (N = 17792) 
 
SES  Education Age Proportion 
Female 
 
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD N 
Argentina 3.84 1.71 1.53 1.34 59.6 18.4 .51 360 
Australia 5.17 1.85 1.97 1.22 66.1 15.1 .50 182 
Austria 5.17 1.95 2.74 1.88 67.2 13.9 .50 427 
Belgium 4.90 1.82 2.28 1.17 66.6 15.0 .48 295 
Bulgaria 3.46 2.29 2.87 1.31 59.0 17.2 .57 405 
Chile 2.80 1.45 1.86 1.23 54.9 18.9 .58 659 
China 2.62 1.65 1.74 1.24 48.4 15.1 .49 1045 
Croatia 3.23 1.62 2.20 1.41 60.1 15.8 .58 385 
Cyprus 3.76 1.49 1.75 1.26 61.0 13.5 .47 152 
Czech Republic 3.55 1.56 2.23 1.01 57.6 16.8 .63 375 
Denmark 4.74 1.97 2.99 1.31 66.6 14.6 .55 402 
Estonia 3.91 1.79 3.02 1.17 64.6 15.4 .69 401 
Finland 4.62 2.05 2.54 1.48 61.1 15.0 .55 173 
France 4.08 1.79 2.21 1.41 64.4 15.3 .48 1133 
Germany 4.80 1.82 1.70 1.19 66.0 16.3 .54 415 
Great Britain 4.08 1.87 1.51 1.72 59.7 19.0 .59 302 
Hungary 2.97 1.28 1.95 1.19 51.5 17.4 .60 464 
Iceland 4.81 1.91 2.05 1.40 62.9 17.7 .54 209 
Israel 3.87 2.08 2.60 1.35 52.5 21.7 .50 345 
Italy 3.44 1.80 2.59 1.22 56.2 18.6 .52 385 
Japan 3.72 1.75 2.87 1.34 58.0 18.1 .49 519 
Latvia 2.90 1.22 2.70 1.26 55.1 15.8 .63 378 
New Zealand 5.12 2.11 2.63 1.72 65.5 17.2 .52 238 
Norway 5.21 1.97 3.15 1.40 62.6 13.9 .51 321 
Philippines 2.85 1.73 2.00 1.32 51.3 18.6 .47 402 
Poland 3.80 1.84 2.23 1.19 60.7 16.7 .57 319 
Portugal 2.98 1.77 1.40 1.08 58.1 18.4 .60 442 
Russia 3.19 1.80 3.04 1.27 58.4 18.1 .66 651 
Slovak Republic 3.39 1.48 2.20 1.10 57.6 17.1 .62 323 
Slovenia 3.77 1.69 1.94 1.29 61.3 18.1 .56 298 
South Africa 2.91 1.55 1.30 1.46 45.5 18.6 .64 993 
Spain 2.88 1.23 2.45 1.45 53.4 17.6 .54 485 
South Korea 3.89 1.61 1.81 1.16 62.9 17.5 .53 332 
Sweden 5.01 1.90 2.37 1.44 64.0 13.8 .48 275 
Switzerland 4.95 1.87 2.18 1.14 69.1 15.2 .58 332 
Taiwan 2.83 1.40 2.13 1.43 52.4 18.6 .47 781 
Turkey 2.47 1.38 1.27 1.14 46.7 17.2 .52 588 
Ukraine 2.57 1.24 3.30 1.07 56.1 17.2 .69 1017 
US 5.03 2.08 3.30 1.28 66.7 15.9 .56 397 
Venezuela 3.42 1.77 2.09 1.47 46.3 19.4 .50 187 
Unweighted Avg 3.82 1.73 2.27 1.31 58.9 16.8 .55 445 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of ISSP:2009 by Country (N = 55238) 
 
SES  Education Age Proportion 
Non-UD 
 
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD N 
Argentina 4.96 1.54 2.32 1.46 46.7 17.5 .12 1133 
Australia 6.01 1.37 2.43 1.23 45.1 17.1 .24 1019 
Austria 5.84 1.55 3.46 1.64 52.5 16.8 .17 1525 
Belgium 5.86 1.53 2.91 1.16 48.9 17.6 .21 1115 
Bulgaria 4.89 2.16 3.41 1.24 49.1 17.2 .14 1000 
Chile 4.03 1.66 2.53 1.43 46.6 17.6 .05 1505 
China 4.60 1.96 2.18 1.31 43.0 14.1 .15 3010 
Croatia 4.62 1.68 2.71 1.28 45.7 17.6 .08 1201 
Cyprus 5.50 1.54 3.07 1.39 42.6 15.4 .18 1000 
Czech Republic 4.87 1.56 2.57 1.09 46.8 16.8 .13 1205 
Denmark 5.77 1.59 3.38 1.15 50.2 17.0 .23 1518 
Estonia 4.94 1.75 3.24 1.13 50.9 18.8 .08 1005 
Finland 6.04 1.73 3.02 1.53 47.6 16.5 .21 880 
France 4.89 1.63 2.83 1.53 55.1 15.7 .13 2817 
Germany 5.70 1.53 2.24 1.38 49.6 17.9 .21 1395 
Great Britain 5.24 1.70 2.43 1.84 50.1 17.2 .17 958 
Hungary 4.04 1.51 2.48 1.24 46.2 15.9 .06 1010 
Iceland 5.86 1.55 2.84 1.62 46.1 17.3 .21 947 
Israel 5.42 1.93 3.09 1.33 43.5 17.5 .17 1193 
Italy 4.61 1.70 2.99 1.26 48.3 17.1 .11 1084 
Japan 4.65 1.59 3.20 1.31 49.2 17.6 .08 1296 
Latvia 4.47 1.71 3.07 1.24 44.4 17.0 .07 1069 
New Zealand 5.94 1.62 3.27 1.64 50.6 17.0 .21 935 
Norway 6.10 1.50 3.58 1.29 47.4 15.4 .27 1456 
Philippines 4.50 1.82 2.61 1.42 42.5 16.1 .06 1200 
Poland 5.27 1.70 2.89 1.30 46.0 17.1 .14 1263 
Portugal 4.42 2.07 2.04 1.45 49.4 18.1 .09 1000 
Russia 4.66 1.90 3.47 1.18 46.8 18.4 .10 1603 
Slovak Republic 4.86 1.58 2.73 1.17 46.3 16.3 .10 1159 
Slovenia 4.93 1.53 2.66 1.38 46.7 17.8 .10 1065 
South Africa 4.90 1.97 2.13 1.59 39.3 15.7 .12 3305 
South Korea 4.51 1.57 3.39 1.35 43.5 15.2 .11 1599 
Spain 4.98 1.41 2.57 1.37 47.1 17.9 .11 1215 
Sweden 5.89 1.53 3.01 1.48 48.5 16.3 .22 1137 
Switzerland 5.71 1.56 2.62 1.28 50.1 17.7 .18 1229 
Taiwan 4.26 1.63 2.95 1.51 44.8 16.6 .08 2026 
Turkey 4.23 1.86 1.77 1.38 41.2 15.5 .07 1569 
Ukraine 3.74 1.68 3.56 1.04 48.2 17.7 .03 2012 
United States 5.79 1.60 3.65 1.14 49.5 17.1 .21 1581 
Venezuela 5.42 1.91 2.71 1.32 36.8 15.0 .14 999 
Unweighted Avg 5.07 1.67 2.85 1.35 46.8 16.9 .14 1381 
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The relative response patterns on inequality and egalitarianism attitudes varied across the 
8 Likert-items, across each country, and between the two study samples. The descriptive 
statistics and interclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) for the null models for topdogs and 
underdogs, respectively, are provided in Tables 4 and 5. The means were generally higher for 
underdogs than topdogs, supporting previous findings about the underdog theory. The ICCs for 
the dependent variables, which represent the proportion of between-country variance, ranged 
from .099 to .189, with the exception of item 5, which had an ICC of .07 for both groups.  
 
 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics, ICC and Response Rates of Dependent Variables 
(Socioeconomic Inequality and Egalitarianism Attitudes) for Topdogs 
Question Mean SD ICC N 
Resp 
rate 
1. Differences in income in <R’s country> are too 
large (1=SA, 5=SD). [reversely coded] 
3.96 1.04 .174 7275 .988 
2. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
the differences in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes (1=SA, 5=SD). 
[reversely coded] 
3.50 1.23 .148 7230 .981 
3. The government should provide a decent standard 
of living for the unemployed (1=SA, 5=SD). 
[reversely coded] 
3.70 1.06 .116 7238 .983 
4. The government should spend less on benefits for 
the poor (1=SA, 5=SD). 
3.64 1.14 .109 7198 .977 
5. Do you think people with high incomes should pay 
a larger share of their income in taxes than those 
with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share 
(1=Much larger, 5=Much smaller)? [reversely 
coded] 
3.88 0.77 .069 7177 .974 
6. Generally, how would you describe taxes in <R’s 
country> today for those with high incomes 
(1=Much too high, 5=Much too low)? 
3.14 1.07 .106 7017 .953 
7. Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people with 
higher incomes can buy better health care than 
people with lower incomes (1=Very just, 5=Very 
unjust)? 
3.30 1.31 .153 7226 .981 
8. Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people with 
higher incomes can buy better education for their 
children than people with lower incomes (1=Very 
just, 5=Very unjust)? 
3.32 1.30 .159 7214 .979 
Note. Higher mean value indicates greater agreement with egalitarian statements; ICC = 
interclass correlation coefficient; Resp rate = response rate for item.  
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables (Socioeconomic Inequality and 
Egalitarianism Attitudes) for Underdogs 
Question Mean SD ICC N Resp rate 
1. Differences in income in <R’s country> are too 
large (1=SA, 5=SD). [reversely coded] 
4.37 .84 .136 
 
17343 .975 
2. It is the responsibility of the government to 
reduce the differences in income between people 
with high incomes and those with low incomes 
(1=SA, 5=SD). [reversely coded] 
4.05 1.03 .151 
 
17176 .965 
3. The government should provide a decent 
standard of living for the unemployed (1=SA, 
5=SD). [reversely coded] 
4.06 .93 .099 
 
17313 .973 
4. The government should spend less on benefits for 
the poor (1=SA, 5=SD). 
3.76 1.24 .115 
 
17154 .964 
5. Do you think people with high incomes should 
pay a larger share of their income in taxes than 
those with low incomes, the same share, or a 
smaller share (1=Much larger, 5=Much smaller)? 
[reversely coded] 
4.14 .78 .071 
 
16647 .936 
6. Generally, how would you describe taxes in <R’s 
country> today for those with high incomes 
(1=Much too high, 5=Much too low)? 
3.50 1.10 .133 
 
15291 .859 
7. Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people 
with higher incomes can buy better health care 
than people with lower incomes (1=Very just, 
5=Very unjust)? 
3.68 1.31 .178 
 
17081 .960 
8. Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people 
with higher incomes can buy better education for 
their children than people with lower incomes 
(1=Very just, 5=Very unjust)? 
3.60 1.34 .189 
 
17087 .960 
Note. Higher mean value indicates greater agreement with egalitarian statements; ICC = 
interclass correlation coefficient; Resp rate = response rate for item.  
 
 
Model Results 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show the fixed and random effects from the models predicting socioeconomic 
inequality and egalitarianism attitudes (Q1-Q8). Robust standard errors were used for all models 
because the assumption of homogeneity of level-1 residual variance was violated for each 
outcome variable. Social welfare attitudes, after controlling for all covariates, ranged between 
3.2 and 4.0 for topdogs and 3.5 and 4.3 for underdogs, on a scale of 1 through 5. For both 
groups, mean country education level and age were generally not significantly and/or practically 
related to attitude. For both groups, for about half of the questions, the higher the proportion of 
topdogs (or the lower the proportion of underdogs) in the country, the lower the social welfare 
attitudes. Individual SES was negatively related to attitude, on most questions, for both groups. 
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Interestingly, the association between educational attainment and attitude towards social welfare 
differed across the two groups, as detailed below.  
 
 
TABLE 6 
Prediction of Social Welfare Attitudes for Topdogs 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
Q1 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q2 
Coeffi
cient 
(SE) 
Model 
Q3 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q4 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q5 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q6 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q7 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q8 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Attitude         
Intercept 4.042 
(.053)**
* 
3.610 
(.060)
*** 
3.740 
(.053)*
** 
3.659 
(.058)**
* 
3.901 
(.031)**
* 
3.180 
(.054)**
* 
3.378 
(.080)**
* 
3.377 
(.080)**
* 
NUD 
propn 
-3.949 
(.950)**
* 
-3.843 
(.979)
*** 
-2.765 
(.880)*
* 
.409 
(.932) 
-1.369 
(.547)* 
-1.582 
(.848)
 
.204 
(1.077) 
1.034 
(1.144) 
Mean 
degree 
-.169 
(.098)
+ 
-.191 
(.133) 
.016 
(.122) 
.236 
(.133) 
.015 
(.075) 
.118 
(.121) 
.060 
(.183) 
.091 
(.182) 
Age 
.005 
(.001)**
* 
.001 
(.001) 
.003 
(.001)*
* 
.006 
(.001)**
* 
.004 
(.001)**
* 
.007 
(.001)**
* 
.003 
(.001)* 
.001 
(.001) 
Degree 
-.060 
(.015)**
* 
-.101 
(.016)
*** 
-.033 
(.015)* 
.026 
(.016) 
-.023 
(.011)* 
-.036 
(.016)* 
-.080 
(.018)**
*
 
-.061 
(.017)** 
SES 
-.115 
(.026)**
* 
-.117 
(.023)
*** 
-.020 
(.016) 
-.038 
(.020) 
-.053 
(.012)**
* 
-.116 
(.022)**
* 
-.099 
(.021)**
* 
-.103 
(.019)**
* 
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Random 
Effects 
(Variance 
components) 
        
Variance in 
adjusted 
group 
means 
.113*** .142*** .114*** .133*** .035*** .117*** .264*** .264*** 
Variance in 
degree 
slopes 
.007*** .005*** .004*** .006*** .002*** .007*** .008*** .006*** 
Variance 
within 
groups 
.858 1.250 .978 1.135 .553 .998 1.367 1.353 
Lv1 
variance 
explained 
3.9% 3.1% 1.0% 1.7% 1.3% 2.9% 2.3% 1.7% 
Lv2 
intercept 
variance 
explained 
36.4% 34.2% 9.7% 2.3% 10.3% <1% <1% <1% 
Note.
 +
p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,  *** p<.001. All regression coefficients and their standard errors, 
and variance components are calculated based on restricted maximum likelihood estimation. 
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TABLE 7 
Prediction of Social Welfare Attitudes for Underdogs 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model Q1 
Coefficien
t (SE) 
Model 
Q2 
Coeffici
ent 
(SE) 
Model 
Q3 
Coeffici
ent 
(SE) 
Model 
Q4 
Coeffi
cient 
(SE) 
Model 
Q5 
Coefficie
nt (SE) 
Model 
Q6 
Coeffici
ent (SE) 
Model 
Q7 
Coefficie
nt (SE) 
Model 
Q8 
Coefficie
nt (SE) 
Attitude          
   
Intercept 
4.341 
(.042)*** 
4.028 
(.050)
*** 
4.026 
(.037)*** 
3.853 
(.061)
*** 
4.129 
(.029)*** 
3.530 
(.062)*
** 
3.721 
(.086)**
* 
3.676 
(.088)**
* 
   UD 
propn  
1.729 
(.398)*** 
1.836 
(.566)
** 
1.248 
(.397)** 
-.601 
(.508) 
1.205 
(.303)*** 
1.301 
(.522)*
 
.535 
(.781) 
.096 
(.710) 
   Mean 
degree 
-.077 
(.064)
 
-.057 
(.101) 
.006 
(.084) 
.324 
(.129)
* 
.085 
(.048)
+
 
.170 
(.121) 
.297 
(.160)
+
 
.285 
(.152)
+
 
Age -.001 
(< .001)
+
 
< .00
1 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.000)*** 
.002 
(.001)*
* 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Degree -.004 
(.009) 
-.046 
(.008)
*** 
-.017 
(.009)
+
 
.004 
(.012) 
-.002 
(.006) 
.008 
(.010) 
-.038 
(.012)**
 
-.026 
(.012)* 
SES -.052 
(.006)*** 
-.072 
(.008)
*** 
-.061 
(.007)*** 
-.040 
(.007)
*** 
-.042 
(.006)*** 
-.059 
(.008)*
** 
-.058 
(.010)**
* 
-.062 
(.011)**
* 
Female .014 
(.014) 
.028 
(.014)
* 
.019 
(.015) 
.005 
(.018) 
-.017 
(.010) 
-.053 
(.015)*
** 
.077 
(.019)**
* 
.078 
(.018)**
* 
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Random 
Effects 
(Variance 
components) 
        
Variance in 
adjusted 
group 
means 
.071*** .103*** .058*** .152*** .031*** .147*** .307*** .336*** 
Variance in 
degree 
slopes 
.002*** .001*** .002*** .003*** .000*** .002*** .004*** .004*** 
Variance in 
SES slopes 
.001*** .002*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .002*** .004*** .004*** 
Variance 
within 
group 
.598 .880 .779 1.300 .550 1.001 1.332 1.361 
Lv1 
variance 
explained 
4.5% 3.6% 3.0% 1.2% 2.0% 2.8% 2.4% 2.8% 
Lv2 
intercept 
variance 
explained 
25.0% 34.8% 30.6% 8.8% 22.8% 4.2% <1% <1% 
Note.
 +
p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,  *** p<.001. All coefficients and standard errors of fixed effects, 
and variance components are calculated based on restricted maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE ATTITUDES     73 
After controlling for covariates, the mean level of agreement with the statement that 
income inequality is too high (question 1), was 4.04 for topdogs and 4.34, for underdogs. All else 
being equal, a topdog with a university degree was likely to express more disagreement with that 
statement—on average, by 0.3 points on a 5-point scale— than someone with no formal 
education. In contrast, there was no difference in the level of agreement with that statement 
between more and less well educated underdogs.  
The mean level of agreement with the statement that the government should be 
responsible for redistributing income (question 2), after controlling for all variables in the model, 
was also higher for underdogs (4.03) than topdogs (3.61). All else being equal, a topdog with a 
university degree was likely to express more disagreement with that statement—on average, by 
over 0.5 points— than someone with no formal education. In contrast, an underdog with a 
university degree was less likely to express disagreement with the statement by about 0.2 points.  
 Regarding the statement that it is the government’s responsibility to provide a decent 
standard of living for the unemployed (question 3), all else held constant, underdogs were again 
more in agreement (4.0) than the topdogs (3.7). And again, educational attainment was 
associated with less support among topdogs (university degree holders disagreed by 
approximately 0.16 points), but held no relationship among underdogs.  
All else held constant, educational attainment was not related to the statement that the 
government should spend less on the benefits for the poor (question 4), for both topdogs and 
underdogs. The general sentiment regarding this question, after controlling for all variables, was 
also quite similar between the groups (3.67 for topdogs and 3.85 for underdogs).  
After controlling for covariates, both topdogs and underdogs thought high earners should 
pay a relatively larger proportion of taxes (question 5, means were 3.90 and 4.13, respectively). 
All else being equal, those with a university degree were likely to express less support with this 
idea than those with no formal education if they were a topdog (by 0.12 points), but not if they 
were an underdog.  
Similarly, after controlling for covariates, both topdogs and underdogs thought, on 
average, that taxes for the rich in one’s country were somewhat too low (question 6), although 
the underdogs had a stronger such belief (3.53) than topdogs (3.18). Here again, those with a 
university degree were likely to agree less with that idea than those with no formal education if 
they were a topdog (by .18 points), but not if they were an underdog.  
Question 7 asked whether it was just or unjust that people with higher incomes can 
purchase better healthcare. All else held constant, underdogs were more likely to feel that this 
was more unjust (3.72) than topdogs (3.38). Furthermore, all else held constant, topdogs with a 
university degree scored 0.40 points lower on the scale than those with no formal education, 
while the discrepancy among the two educational groups was only 0.19 points (in the same 
direction) for underdogs.  
The pattern was similar for the question on whether it was just that those with a higher 
income could afford better education for their children (question 8). Underdogs, after controlling 
for other variables, tended to feel that this was more unjust (3.67) than topdogs (3.38). The 
university educated topdog was estimated to score .31 points lower on the scale than a non-
formally educated topdog, while the university educated underdog was estimated to score just 
0.10 points lower on the scale than a non-formally educated underdog. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The results suggest that among topdogs, after controlling for mean country educational 
attainment, proportion of topdog, age, and socioeconomic status, educational attainment tends to 
be associated with a less favorable attitude towards social welfare. Seven out of eight attitude 
responses had a non-zero association with educational attainment, and all were negative. The 
greatest association (in terms of raw scores) was observed for question 2, which stated it was the 
government’s responsibility to reduce differences in income between people with high and low 
incomes. After controlling for all other variables in the model, on average, someone who has 
completed a university degree, would disagree more by 0.50 points on a 5-point scale than 
someone with no formal education. More education was also associated with less support for the 
following statements: 1) income difference in one’s country was too large, 2) the government 
should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, 3) people with high incomes 
should pay a larger proportion of their income in taxes, or that taxes are much too low for the 
wealthy, and 4) it is unjust for those with higher income to be able to afford better education for 
their children and better health care.  
These results contrasted sharply from the parallel analyses we conducted on underdogs. 
After controlling for age, SES, gender, mean degree, and proportion of underdogs, educational 
attainment of the underdogs had either no relationship, or markedly less (less than half) of a 
negative relationship relative to topdogs with the eight attitude outcome variables.  
There are several possible reasons that education was negatively associated with 
egalitarianism and social welfare attitudes for these topdogs. For instance, it could be that 
education makes people less compassionate and/or more self-centered, and thus less likely to 
agree with egalitarian views. This would be consistent with recent concerns that education has 
been too narrowly focused on improving students’ capacity to function in the economic 
marketplace and not attentive enough to other important aims such as good citizenship, or 
knowledge acquisition for the sake of being wiser (Biesta, 2009; Labaree, 2014; Siegel, 2004). 
Alternatively, education may make people more complex and nuanced in their views, more 
moderate, and less likely to agree with general statements, like those asked in this cross-national 
survey. It could also be the case that those with education are less supportive of social welfare 
because they consciously or subconsciously wish to take advantage of structures that produce 
social inequalities. Because these results were based on cross-sectional data, there is also a 
possibility that social welfare attitudes and egalitarianism affect one’s desire to pursue higher 
levels of education, rather than the other way around.  
It was interesting to us that education was not related to social welfare attitudes among 
underdogs. Having a minority status may provide immunity or protection against the 
aforementioned (hypothesized) effects of education on attitude among topdogs. This could be 
because one’s status and/or identity as a societal minority much strongly shapes one’s attitude 
towards social welfare than formal education. It could also be that the education that minorities 
receive is qualitatively different than what those in power receive, or that social minorities seek 
out different kinds of educational experiences than the majority, which in-turn produce 
differential effects.  
A limitation to our study is that many potentially relevant covariates such as academic 
ability, academic motivation, field of academic interest, quality of schooling, beliefs about 
egalitarianism prior to schooling, parent education level, and religious and political 
conservatism, were unavailable to be included in these analyses. In addition, while all variables 
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(dependent and independent) were treated as continuous, age was the only true continuous 
variable. Attitude, educational attainment and SES were, strictly speaking, categorical variables 
each with just 5 or 6 levels. As such, the level-1 and level-2 residuals were less likely to be 
normally distributed.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our results suggest that educational attainment, by itself, may not help people become more 
accepting of social welfare, and that it may even make people less likely to support social 
welfare. Policymakers and proponents of social welfare may find this concerning and want to 
investigate this relationship further to find out, for example, whether particular kinds of 
educational curricula or experiences are contributing to these effects. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the education communities within and across countries should seriously reexamine 
and discuss what the fundamental aims for education are, and whether non-economic aims are 
sufficiently articulated and addressed in our current system.  
Results also suggest that those trying to obtain support on social welfare from topdogs 
may have to work harder or differently to convince topdogs with more education about 
supporting their agenda. The tactics and arguments that garner support from less educated 
topdogs may not work as well with topdogs who are more educated. For educational theorists, 
these results suggest that more research is warranted to find out what education does to people’s 
beliefs and attitudes (if anything), how that affects their actions, and ultimately influences the 
direction of society.  
Finally, our results suggest that the education social minorities attain may differ 
importantly from that attained by topdogs, given education appears to change social welfare 
attitudes for just the topdogs. The nature, mechanism and desirability of this difference should be 
studied further. We hope these results can support researchers’ and practitioners’ recent calls to 
improve the field’s understanding and practice of transformative education—education aimed to 
foster global sustainability and moral inclusion (“Education for sustainable development,”; 
Harris, Shealy, Sternberger, Thomas, & Wishon, 2015; Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005).  
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